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Pot as Pretext: Marijuana, Race, and
the New Disorder in New York City
Street Policingjels_1190 591..633
Amanda Geller and Jeffrey Fagan*
Although possession of small quantities of marijuana has been decriminalized in New York
State since the late 1970s, arrests for marijuana possession in New York City have increased
more than tenfold since the mid-1990s, and remain high more than 10 years later. This
rise has been a notable component of the city’s “Order Maintenance Policing” strategy,
designed to aggressively target low-level offenses, usually through street interdictions
known as “stop, question, and frisk” activity. We analyze data on 2.2 million stops and
arrests carried out from 2004 to 2008, and identify significant racial disparities in the
implementation of marijuana enforcement. These disparities, present in both stops and
arrests, are robust to controls for social structure, local crime conditions, and stop levels
more broadly. The racial imbalance in marijuana enforcement in black neighborhoods
suggests a “doubling down” of street-level policing in places already subject to heightened
scrutiny in the search for weapons, a link suggesting that the policing of marijuana may be
a pretext in the search for guns. Despite these ties, however, we show no significant rela-
tionship between marijuana enforcement activity and the likelihood of seizing firearms or
other weapons. We also show that a large proportion of marijuana enforcement lacks
constitutional justification under either federal or New York law. Marijuana stops are more
prevalent in precincts where “other” and “high-crime area” justifications are more likely to
be reported, two factors that are constitutionally insufficient to justify a street stop. The
racial skew, questionable constitutionality, and limited efficiency of marijuana enforce-
ment in detecting serious crimes suggest that nonwhite New Yorkers bear a racial tax from
contemporary policing strategy, a social cost not offset by any substantial observed benefits
to public safety.
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Schools of Social Work and Law at Columbia University; Fagan is Professor of Law and Public Health and Director of
the Center for Crime, Community and Law at Columbia Law School.
The authors are grateful to the New York Civil Liberties Union for pursuing the litigation that resulted in public
disclosure of data on stops and frisks conducted by the New York City Police Department. The New York State Division
of Criminal Justice Services generously provided detailed data on crime- and race-specific arrests in New York City.
Thanks to James Quinn for his heroic efforts to geocode unruly data on stop locations. Stephen H. Clarke provided
truly outstanding research assistance. Robert MacCoun and Paul Heaton provided valuable feedback on earlier
versions of this article, as did seminar participants at the Columbia University School of Social Work and an
anonymous reviewer. Support for this research was provided in part by the City Council of the City of New York and
by Columbia Law School. All opinions, conclusions, or errors are those of the authors alone.
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
Volume 7, Issue 4, 591–633, December 2010
591
I. Introduction
Police enforcement of marijuana offenses in New York City has grown dramatically over
the past half-century, and has intensified in recent years. Marijuana arrests have nearly
doubled since the mid-1990s despite the decriminalization of marijuana possession (in
small quantities) in 1977 by the New York State Legislature (Golub, Johnson & Dunlap
2006, 2007; Levine & Small 2008). This new focus on marijuana was one of the key
components of then-Mayor Giuliani’s strategy of Order Maintenance Policing (OMP) in
New York City (Livingston 1997; Spitzer 1999; Harcourt 2001; Golub et al. 2007; Harcourt
& Ludwig 2007). As part of OMP, police began targeting individuals “possessing, selling,
or smoking even small amounts of marijuana” as part of their efforts to intensively
enforce “quality of life” crimes and other minor misdemeanors (Flynn 1998). The central
tactic in this search for marijuana was the use of aggressive “stop, question, and frisk”
(SQF) tactics to identify would-be offenders (Harcourt 2001; Waldeck 2000; Fagan &
Davies 2000; Levine & Small 2008).
Figure 1 shows that marijuana possession arrests skyrocketed with the advent of
“quality of life” enforcement in 1994. By 2000, marijuana arrests accounted for 15
percent of all adult arrests in the city, more than any nondrug misdemeanor charge
(Levine & Small 2008; Golub et al. 2007). By 2006, rates were nearly 500 percent greater
than a decade earlier. In fact, New York City’s four largest boroughs rank in the top five
U.S. counties in per-capita marijuana arrest rates (King & Mauer 2006; Levine & Small
2008).
Figure 1: Marijuana possession arrests, NYC.
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The bulk of marijuana possession enforcement in New York City has fallen on the
city’s black and Hispanic residents (cf. Dwyer 2009), a skew at odds with the racial and
ethnic patterns of marijuana use observed in local and national survey data. The Monitor-
ing the Future Survey, an annual survey of substance use among high school seniors and
eighth graders, shows that teenage marijuana use since 1990 is higher among whites than
other racial or ethnic groups (Johnston et al. 2005). In a study of 43 urban and suburban
neighborhoods, Saxe et al. (2001) show that blacks and Hispanics reported lower rates of
drug use than their white counterparts. The National Survey of Drug Use and Health
(SAMHSA 2007) showed very small differences in marijuana use rates between black and
white teenagers, and lower rates among Hispanics. Yet marijuana arrest rates across the
United States have been far higher for non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics (King & Mauer
2006). In New York City, ground zero for marijuana enforcement nationally (King & Mauer
2006; Levine & Small 2008), youth are less like to report having used marijuana than their
counterparts nationwide, and white youth are more likely to have tried illegal substances
(including marijuana as well as other drugs) than blacks or Hispanics (New York City
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 2007).
The racial disparity in marijuana arrests may be explained by the availability of
marijuana smokers and sellers in minority communities. Saxe et al. (2001) note that since
visible drug sales are more prevalent in minority neighborhoods, police can simply choose
efficiency over distributive concerns by focusing on the “low hanging fruit” of visible
marijuana use. However, that choice has produced large racial disparities in misdemeanor
marijuana arrest rates relative to race-specific rates of marijuana possession or use, and only
tells part of the story of enforcement patterns in New York City.
Operationally, the majority of marijuana arrests in New York City stem from “stop,
question, and frisk” activity (SQF), the tactical engine of OMP (Levine & Small 2008).
Street stops are conducted predominantly in poor neighborhoods with high concentrations
of black and Hispanic residents, at levels that exceed even what local disorder and crime
conditions would predict (Spitzer 1999; Fagan & Davies 2000; Gelman et al. 2007; Fagan
et al. 2010), and marijuana arrests are clustered in many of the same neighborhoods where
SQF is carried out with the highest intensity (Harcourt & Ludwig 2007; Levine & Small
2008).
In this article, we examine the role that marijuana enforcement plays in the
broader tactical landscape of OMP, with several tests of the links between SQF activity
and marijuana enforcement. We identify racial disparities in marijuana stop and arrest
patterns at both the individual and precinct levels. We also test whether any observed
concentration of marijuana enforcement in minority precincts is driven by crime patterns
or enforcement patterns more broadly, and how the police pursuit of marijuana ties into
the primary goal of OMP, the pursuit of weapons. Next, we use the stated rationales
recorded for each stop to examine the documented circumstances of these marijuana
stops in order to assess the constitutional legality of this police behavior. Finally, we assess
the efficiency of marijuana stops in detecting both marijuana possession and other illegal
activities. To the extent that marijuana enforcement is grounded in OMP principles and
practices, it raises the same constitutional and public safety concerns. These concerns are
the focus of this analysis.
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II. Constitutional and Criminological Background
A. Doubling Down on Pot: A Brief History of Order Maintenance Policing
Following the election of Rudolph Giuliani as mayor in 1993, newly appointed NYPD
Commissioner William Bratton implemented a regime he called Order Maintenance Polic-
ing (OMP), which—together with other management reforms and innovations such as
CompStat1 crime mapping and accounting—dramatically and suddenly changed both the
strategy and tactics of policing across the city (Bratton & Knobler 1998; Silverman 1999).
The new strategy was grounded in “broken windows” theory (Wilson & Kelling 1982; Kelling
& Coles 1996) and focused on the connection between physical and social disorder and
violent crime (Greene 1999; Livingston 1997; Spitzer 1999; Sampson & Raudenbush 1999;
Duneier & Molotch 1999; Waldeck 2000; Fagan & Davies 2000; Taylor 2001; Harcourt 2001;
Garnett 2005; Fagan et al. 2010).
The broken windows theory suggested that the police “take care of the little things,”
such as physical and social disorder, to prevent the onset of more serious crime (Wilson &
Kelling 1982). The chief architect of the OMP strategy, Jack Maple, suggested that these
“little things” be taken care of through the aggressive interdiction of individuals engaged in
disorderly activity, reasoning that disorderly individuals were likely to be carrying weapons
or other contraband, or be on their way to or from robberies or other violent crimes (Maple
& Mitchell 1999). To stop them, police were to preemptively and aggressively engage them
and, if necessary, frisk and search them for weapons and contraband (Kelling & Coles 1996;
Bratton & Knobler 1998; Silverman 1999; Maple & Mitchell 1999). These aggressive “stop,
question, and frisk” (SQF) tactics were designed to reduce violence and weapons (especially
firearms) possession (Spitzer 1999; Waldeck 2000; Fagan & Davies 2000; Harcourt 2001).
Accordingly, Police Strategy No. 5, Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York, articulated
a reconstructed version of broken windows theory as the driving force in the development
of policing policy. It stated that the NYPD would apply its enforcement efforts to “reclaim
the streets” by systematically and aggressively enforcing laws against low-level social disorder:
graffiti, aggressive panhandling, fare beating, public drunkenness, unlicensed vending,
public drinking, public urination, and other low-level misdemeanor offenses. Applying
Maple’s ideas, the strategy of targeting low-level offenders was thought to leverage the
prevention of more serious crime as well because individuals stopped for minor offenses
might also be carrying weapons, or have outstanding warrants for more serious crimes
(Kelling & Coles 1996). While the shift to marijuana was not explicitly stated in any of the
policy memoranda or public pronouncements that launched OMP, marijuana and serious
crime have been linked rhetorically, if not scientifically, since the early 20th century
1CompStat combines real-time (or nearly real-time) crime accounting with strategic analysis. CompStat generates data
for systematic analysis of location-specific crime trends and problems, allocation of police resources to respond to
those trends, and identification of performance measures for individual officers and their commanders based on
responses of crime trends to their data. CompStat meetings, where the performance of local commanders is reviewed
regularly and publicly, provide a dramatic forum where institutional norms of accountability are efficiently commu-
nicated through direct language and action such as police administrators to either reward or punish, sometimes with
public shaming or humiliation, performance as measured against quantitative indicia based on crime analysis (see
also Silverman 1999; Bratton & Knoebler 1998; Weisburd et al. 2004).
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(Bonnie & Whitebread 1970). As OMP implementation progressed in New York City,
marijuana possession quickly became a targeted offense.2
B. Race, Crime, and Order Maintenance Policing
The role of race in OMP has been highly contested. Critics of OMP point out not only the
disproportionate stop levels faced by minority citizens and neighborhoods, but significant
racial differences in poststop outcomes (cf. Dwyer 2009). Although the OMP strategy was
designed as a place-based intervention, targeting areas characterized by disorder and high
crime levels, the burden of its implementation has predominantly been felt by the city’s
minority residents and communities (Spitzer 1999; Kocieniewski 1999; Roane 1999; Jackson
2000; Fagan & Davies 2000). In a 15-month period from January 1998 through March 1999,
non-Hispanic black, Hispanic black, and Hispanic white New Yorkers were three times
more likely than their white counterparts to be stopped and frisked on suspicion of
weapons or violent crimes relative to each group’s participation in each of those two types
of crimes (Gelman et al. 2007). Moreover, OMP was concentrated in predominantly minor-
ity neighborhoods at rates that far exceeded what local levels of crime and disorder would
predict (Gelman et al. 2007; Fagan et al. 2010).
Street stop outcomes also suggest racial disparities: particularly in the late 1990s,
stops of black citizens had significantly lower hit rates than those of whites, and these
disparities persist at the neighborhood level, suggesting that residents of black neighbor-
hoods are subject to a lower threshold of suspicion than their white counterparts (Gelman
et al. 2007; Fagan et al. 2010). Poststop outcomes differ by race in other ways as well: blacks
and Hispanics are more likely to be searched or frisked than whites, and more likely to be
subjected to physical force (Ridgeway 2007).
Proponents of SQF practices point out that ethnic minorities are more likely to be
victims of crime than their white counterparts, and that crime rates are higher in minority
neighborhoods (Bratton & Knobler 1998; Smith & Purtell 2008). They justify excess stops
of black citizens by claiming that the racial distribution of stops reflects the racial distribu-
tion of crime suspects (Ridgeway 2007; MacDonald 2009). However, only about 20 percent
of all stops are based on a specific suspect description, leaving this justification irrelevant to
the remaining 80 percent (Spitzer 1999; Fagan et al. 2010). Proponents also claim that
2The origins of the formal connection between OMP and marijuana enforcement may lie in Operation Condor, one
of the core crime control initiatives that drove the increase in marijuana arrests since the mid-1990s. Condor was a
Giuliani Administration initiative that began in 1999 as an aggressive narcotics enforcement program targeting
low-level drug transactions, and later expanding to include quality of life violations. Condor flooded high-crime areas
with additional officers and, at its peak, cost more than $100 million a year in overtime costs, bringing officers in to
work additional shifts on their days off to pursue drug crimes, especially marijuana (Rashbaum 2003). Condor officers
were involved in the killing of Patrick Dorismond, who struggled with police officers after refusing their efforts to
entice him to buy marijuana in a reverse sting (Flynn 2000). At its peak, Condor was credited with placing an
additional 1,000 officers per day on patrol (Rashbaum 2002). Condor was criticized by detectives and police union
officials for its aggressive tactics, such as suspicionless searches and targeting minority youths (Flynn 2000), and was,
after 2004, replaced by Operation Impact, which targeted specific neighborhoods that were identified through both
CompStat analysis and local intelligence, with rookie police officers. One precinct commander referred to it as
“pinpoint precision bombing” (Dawan 2003).
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racial disparities in stop practices are grounded in the targeting of high crime areas, rather
than resulting from explicit racial targeting. In this account, the fact that those areas are
populated by black New Yorkers is incidental to the pattern of stops.
The empirical support most often cited by proponents of OMP is the drastic reduc-
tion in New York City crime rates throughout the 1990s, which they credit to SQF practices
(Smith & Purtell 2008; MacDonald 2009). However, the effectiveness of OMP in preventing
or interdicting crime is also a topic of contentious debate. The yield of firearms and other
weapons seized, perhaps the primary rationale for aggressive stops under OMP (Bratton &
Knobler 1998; Spitzer 1999; Maple & Mitchell 1999), is low. In 2003, a total of 633 firearms
were seized pursuant to stops, a rate of 3.9 seizures per 1,000 stops. By 2006, following a 300
percent increase in the number of stops, the seizure rate fell to 1.4 per 1,000 stops (Fagan
et al. 2010). The rate of arrests pursuant to street stops also declined with rising stop rates,
from 15.4 percent in approximately 125,000 street stops in 1998 (Spitzer 1999; Gelman
et al. 2007) to less than 5 percent in about 500,000 stops in 2006 (Fagan et al. 2010).
Proponents of SQF suggest that these low “hit rates” reflect the success of OMP in mounting
a deterrent threat, leading to the withdrawal of would-be offenders from crime. However,
significant crime declines in many other large cities suggest that larger secular processes
may be as influential in the ongoing crime decline as city-specific processes (cf. Harcourt &
Ludwig 2006; Rosenfeld et al. 2005).
C. Constitutional Regulation
Just as OMP, which was based on theories of social and physical disorder (Livingston 1997;
Harcourt 1998; Waldeck 2000; Fagan & Davies 2000),3 gave rise to equal protection con-
cerns because of its racial and spatial concentration, marijuana enforcement runs similar
risks based on its shared policy and tactical foundations. Likewise, since stops under OMP
have raised Fourth Amendment concerns (Spitzer 1999; Gould & Mastrofski 2004;
Harcourt & Meares 2010), it is reasonable to extend those concerns to the legal justifica-
tions of marijuana enforcement. The potential for legal ambiguity is greatest in “high
discretion-low suspicion” stops (Spitzer 1999; Harcourt 2001), and it is clear from the New
York State statute that marijuana enforcement may fall into this category. New York Penal
Law Section 221, detailed in part in Appendix A, distinguishes between “unlawful posses-
sion of marijuana,” which is a violation not punishable by arrest, and “plain-view” marijuana
offenses, and each of these from higher grades of simple possession, which typically require
observation or an act of purchase as the justifying suspicion.
The legal standard in New York that regulates the constitutionality of police conduct
in citizen stops was set forth in People v. De Bour (1976), which expands on the Terry v. Ohio
(1968) standard in federal case law. While Terry assumes that police-civilian encounters,
even suspicionless ones, are consensual and could be terminated by the suspect, De Bour
forbids inquiries “based on mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity” (Carlis 2009). Whether
3At its implementation in 1994, OMP also was based on concerted efforts to reduce violence and, specifically, to detect
and remove illegal weapons. See Spitzer (1999) and Fagan et al. (2010). See also Bratton and Knobler (1998) and
Silverman (1999).
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the suspicion of marijuana possession is sufficient to prompt a stop, and on which charge,
is frequently a matter of officer discretion (Levine & Small 2008). In New York, the court
of appeals set forth a four-tiered scheme in which invasive police actions, ranging from
accusatory questions to frisks and searches, must be justified by progressively elevated levels
of suspicion (see Appendix B).
The elasticity of the rules established by Terry and De Bour and the soft boundaries set
forth in subsequent cases created a wide space of discretion in which police craft could be
justified to stop and frisk citizens at low levels of suspicion.4 The 1999 investigation of the
NYPD’s SQF tactics by the New York State Attorney General’s Office demonstrated the
limited constitutionality of police stops under OMP tactics (Spitzer 1999). Based on a review
by a team of lawyers and social scientists of a sample of 5,000 textual narratives stating the
rationale for police stops and frisks over a 15-month period beginning in January 1998, the
Spitzer Report estimated that approximately 15 percent of all street stops were unjustified
under Fourth Amendment law in effect at that time,5 and the constitutionality of more than
one in three other stops (35.5 percent) was inconclusive. Civilians have also registered
constitutional concerns about street stop activities; complaints to the Civilian Complaint
Review Board increased 66 percent between 2002 and 2006, an increase concurrent with
the rise in street stop activity (Clarke 2009). The substantiation rate of complaints related
to frisks and searches more than doubled between 2002 and 2004, a period in which
complaints related to other forms of improper police behavior saw little change in their
substantiation rate (Clarke 2009).
D. This Study
The intersection of racial disparities and constitutional irregularities in police stops was the
basis for litigation (Daniels v. City of New York, 2003) that led to a consent decree regulating
4Both state and federal courts have expanded the concept of′ “reasonable suspicion” to include location as well as
individual behavior. This opens the door to stops where suspicion is conditioned on the place where it is observed.
The Supreme Court has articulated and refined this “high crime area” doctrine, in cases from Adams v. Williams
(1972) to Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) (Ferguson & Bernache 2008). This line of cases allows police to consider the
character of a neighborhood as a factor that may elevate the suspicion generated by a given action, reducing the
individualized factors required to justify a stop. In Wardlow, the Supreme Court noted that although an individual’s
presence in a “high crime area” does not meet the standard for a particularized suspicion of criminal activity, a
location’s characteristics are relevant to determining whether a behavior is sufficiently suspicious to warrant further
investigation. Though Wardlow has not been fully embraced by the New York Court of Appeals, presence in a high
crime area is one factor that has been shown to elevate suspicion and justify police intervention (Kamins 2009). The
resulting expansion of police authority to justify stop and search activities conflates “high crime areas” with neigh-
borhood racial makeup, placing minority neighborhoods and citizens at increased risk of more frequent police
contact.
5After the publication of that report, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Illinois v. Wardlow (holding that an individual
who suddenly and without provocation flees from identifiable police officers patrolling a high crime area creates
reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment for the police to stop him or her). In practice, the “high crime
area” doctrine permits police officers to take location into account when determining whether they have sufficient
justification to stop and question a suspect. Although being present in a high crime area alone is not sufficient to
justify a stop, this factor in combination with other similarly insufficient factors to justify reasonable suspicion can
combine to form reasonable suspicion. See Ferguson and Bernache (2008). One impact of Wardlow would be the
likely reduction in the estimate in Spitzer (1999) of the number of constitutionally unjustified stops.
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the conduct of street stops and prohibiting the use of race as a factor in the selection of
citizens for stops and subsequent intrusions. The potential for similar irregularities in
marijuana enforcement is a natural consequence and risk of OMP, but the extent to which
these concerns apply is unknown.
Accordingly, in this analysis we test four hypotheses. First, the similarity in the
patterns of street stops and marijuana arrests under OMP have led to characterizations of
marijuana as the new “broken windows,” a manifestation of underlying crime and disorder
problems that justifies aggressive policing in minority neighborhoods (King & Mauer 2006;
Harcourt & Ludwig 2007; Levine & Small 2008). If this is indeed the case, the prevalence
of street stops for marijuana, and marijuana enforcement more broadly, should be greatest
in the city’s minority neighborhoods, the places where OMP activity is most heavily con-
centrated, and where crime rates are higher. However, if these stops represent excess
enforcement, their prevalence should be predicted not only by overall stop activity or by
various indicia of crime, but also by neighborhood demographic and socioeconomic char-
acteristics, especially race.
Second, if the police focus on marijuana is an attempt to link marijuana enforcement
to “quality of life” crimes, based on the broken windows theory that serious crime will fall
as a result, then we would expect marijuana stops to be most prevalent in areas with an
immediate history of violent crime and high levels of disorder complaints. If, on the other
hand, marijuana enforcement is being used as a pretext to pursue a search for weapons,
then we would expect to see more intense marijuana enforcement in areas where weapons
are also heavily pursued.
Third, given the Fourth Amendment concerns raised about OMP more broadly, we
examine the legal justifications provided for marijuana street stops, and test whether the
stated rationales comply with the “reasonable suspicion” required for Terry (street) stops.
We estimate the extent to which these justifications explain observed patterns of stop
activity, anticipating, for example, that precincts where a large percentage of stop activity is
justified by suspicion of a drug transaction would also have high levels of marijuana stops,
and that the narratives of suspicion would explain a large portion of the variation in stop
activity.
Finally, we examine whether marijuana stops contribute to broader public safety
goals. If, as internal police strategy memoranda state, the strict enforcement of minor
offenses such as misdemeanor marijuana possession has positive spill-over effects and
prevents more serious crime, then stopping individuals on suspicion of marijuana posses-
sion might lead to the detection of weapons and other illegal activity as well. We test the
extent to which this is the case.
III. Methods
A. Data
1. Stop Activity
Our analysis is based on a unique and detailed data set from the New York City Police
Department, made publicly available following a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
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request and subsequent court order (New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City Police
Department 2008). The NYPD records information on a form known as the UF-250 each time
a citizen is stopped by the police, according to procedures set forth in the NYPD Patrol
Guide (2009). A copy of the UF-250 is in Appendix C. These records have been maintained
in a digital database since 1998, when the state Attorney General began his investigation of
the department’s stop and frisk tactics (Spitzer 1999), and were updated following the
litigation of Daniels v. City of New York (2003). In this analysis, we use data from 2004–2008.
The UF-250 form requires officers to record information regarding the suspect’s
demographic and physical characteristics, the location and time of day of the stop, the
suspect’s address, and information about the officer who made the stop and the supervisor
who reviewed it. The form contains a free-response section where officers indicate the
suspected offense that generated the stop. We identify those where the suspected crime was
suspicion of marijuana possession.
Officers may use any number of phrases to describe stops based on suspicion of
marijuana possession, but we use a few key and recurring terms to identify these “marijuana
stops.”6 We use similar procedures to identify stops for suspicion of carrying a concealed
weapon (CPW), a primary focus of OMP policing (Spitzer 1999; Fagan et al. 2010), and
other suspected crimes, including “index crimes,”7 other felonies and misdemeanors, and
nonfingerprintable offenses.
The UF-250 data match each stop to its police precinct location, even if the stop was
made by an officer in a command with cross-precinct patrol assignments.8 We aggregate the
records of stops conducted from 2004–2008 into a precinct-year panel, separately identify-
ing total stops, stops for marijuana, and stops for possession of a weapon, and disaggregat-
ing stops by suspect race or ethnicity. The total sample was approximately 2.2 million stops.
2. Stop Legality
The NYPD responded to the Attorney General’s investigation and the subsequent Daniels
litigation by modifying the UF-250 to limit the information that officers could use to justify
6Stops are identified as marijuana stops from the “crimsusp” (i.e., “crime suspected”) field. A 30-character string,
crimsusp is entered by the officers at the time of a stop, and can take on virtually any value, including typographi-
cal errors. The most common designation identifying the criminal possession of marijuana, “CPM,” identifies
30,759 of the marijuana stops identified. At the other end of the spectrum, 1,328 marijuana stops are identified
from “crime suspected” values that appear only once, such as “CPM MISD PSA#0243” or “POSSESSION OF MAR-
JUINA.” A complete list of the 1,738 crimsusp values used to identify marijuana stops is available from the authors
upon request.
7Index offenses, collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, include murder and nonnegligent manslaughter,
forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.
8New York City police precincts are numbered nonconsecutively from 1 to 123. Cross-precinct assignments refer to
those such as those in public housing. For example, enforcement in public housing is assigned a housing bureau,
which in turn is organized into eight police service areas (PSAs). Officers in each PSA area may work in a catchment
area including several public housing developments that span precinct boundaries. Special anti-crime units similarly
work across precinct boundaries. In addition, we drop 1,276 stops from the analysis because they were not reported
with a valid precinct.
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a street stop (Flynn 2001). Whereas officers previously recorded their stop justification in a
narrative form, beginning in 2001 they were required to check one or more of 10 boxes that
indicate the legal basis for the suspicion that led to the stop. The indicia of suspicion listed
on the form reflect the legal framework established by both Terry v. Ohio (1968) and People
v. De Bour (1976).
The UF-250 also includes 10 categories of “additional circumstances” that may con-
dition the initial basis for the stop in instances where the separate indicia of suspicion are
constitutionally insufficient to comply with constitutional standards. For example, while a
person’s “furtive movements” or “turning at the sight of an officer” may be insufficient
alone to justify a stop, Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) grants that if these factors are present in a
“high crime area,” the stop may pass constitutional scrutiny under federal law. Appendix D
lists the factors that are available to officers to justify a stop, and the “additional circum-
stances” that they also can record to modify the stop factors. For both the stop factors and
additional circumstances, officers can check a box marked “Other” if the basis for the stop
does not fit into the available categories. Should a stop proceed to a frisk or a search, the
revised UF-250 form also includes checkboxes for the rationales to justify these poststop
actions.9 The UF-250 database can thus be used to link officers’ assessments of the indicia
of suspicion to the characteristics of a suspect, the suspected crime, the location of the stop,
and its outcome.
The UF-250s also allow a distinction between stops made in response to a previously
reported crime or emergency (commonly referred to as “radio runs”), and stops initiated
based on observed suspicious conduct, not previously reported. For example, an officer
may, based on a radio run, stop a suspect because he or she fits the description provided by
a witness during a 911 call. However, the data show that radio runs account for only 20
percent of the stops made between 2004 and 2008, and an even smaller portion (13
percent) of marijuana stops. Most stops were, instead, initiated by police officers, and
require “reasonable and articulable” suspicion under Terry and De Bour.
3. Poststop Outcomes
In addition to providing officers an opportunity to mark whether a frisk or search was done,
the UF-250 also includes boxes where officers can mark whether an arrest was made,
contraband was seized, and, if a firearm was confiscated, the type of firearm. The UF-250
9As envisioned by DeBour, stops, frisks, and searches are governed by N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50(1) (2007).
However, “stops” and “frisks” are considered separately under New York statutes. A police officer may stop a suspect
but not frisk the suspect given the circumstances. Frisks and searches are governed by N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§ 140.50(3), which requires a legitimate “stop” as a predicate to any frisk. In many cases, reasonable suspicion that a
person is engaging in violent or dangerous crime (such as murder, burglary, assault, etc.) will justify both a stop and
a frisk. A reasonable belief that the suspect has a weapon or that the officer is in danger of physical injury can also
justify a frisk. A search is permissible as a Level 4 DeBour stop where there is probable cause that a crime has occurred
and a search can be conducted either separately from or incident to an arrest. As with the initial stop, these factors
alone may or may not justify further intervention, but when combined with these additional circumstances, the
actions may pass constitutional scrutiny as Level 3 and Level 4 DeBour stops. In each of these levels of police intrusion,
the presence of one of the “additional circumstances” can create constitutionally valid justification for a frisk or search
if other marginal factors are present that alone would be insufficient to justify the further action.
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includes places to mark down whether force was used and, if so, the type of force. Force
categories range from the use of hands to drawing a weapon.
4. Precinct Socioeconomic Conditions
Precinct-level demographic data are drawn from 2006 projections of U.S. Census data (for
details, see ESRI 2006). Projections of total population, race, ethnic, and age breakdowns,
and unemployment are made at the tract level, and aggregated from tracts to police
precincts. Because precincts do not, as a rule, share boundaries with Census tracts, we
allocate tract populations to precincts based on the percent of each tract’s area that falls
into each precinct.10
Data on poverty and the concentration of foreign-born population are observed at
the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) level from the 2005–2007 American Community
Survey. This survey is conducted annually by the Census Bureau to develop mid-decade
demographic and economic indicators for cities and counties. Data on physical disorder are
observed at the subborough level in the 2005 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey.
These data are then allocated to the precincts that most closely fall within the boundaries
of these larger administrative units.
5. Precinct Crime Conditions
Data on reported crimes by suspect race and precinct were obtained by one of the authors
from the NYPD pursuant to litigation in Floyd v. City of New York (2008), and data on arrests
were obtained from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS). Both
the NYPD and DCJS data identify the suspect race (where known) and alleged offense,
though the categories used to classify offenses vary by reporting agency. Because the NYPD
data do not include details on marijuana possession (instead classifying all controlled
substance offenses as “dangerous drugs”), we base our estimates of marijuana possession
arrests on DCJS data.
B. Model Specification
1. Descriptive Analysis
We begin by examining the extent to which the racial disparities observed by Golub et al.
(2007) in marijuana possession arrests are also present in marijuana street stops. We
compare the citywide demographic breakdown of stops for marijuana possession to the
breakdown of arrests for marijuana offenses, all arrests, and the city more broadly. We also
use the (X,Y) coordinates provided by the NYPD to geocode more than 75 percent of
10For example, if precinct A shares area with three Census tracts (A1, A2, and A3), the precinct population is
estimated as:
% of A1 falling into precinct A * population of A1 +
% of A2 falling into precinct A * population of A2 +
% of A3 falling into precinct A * population of A3.
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documented stops to the intersections at which they took place (or a greater level of detail),
and examine the extent to which, as posited by Levine and Small (2008), marijuana street
stops are concentrated in areas with high concentrations of black residents.
2. Modeling Approach: Marijuana Stop Prevalence
We next estimate a set of models to test whether any observed racial disparities in marijuana
stop activity can be explained by precinct socioeconomic factors or citywide trends in
policing.11 We use generalized estimating equations (GEEs) with a negative binomial
functional form to reflect the discrete nature of stop counts, and a population exposure
variable to reflect the expectation of higher stop counts in more populated areas. GEEs are
beneficial for nested data (such as years nested within precincts), as they allow the speci-
fication of within-subject correlations of observations (Hardin & Hilbe 2003; Ballinger
2004). We assume an AR(1) covariance of years within precincts to account for autocorre-
lation in rates of both the dependent variables and predictors in each precinct.
We begin by examining the extent to which stop counts vary by precinct racial
composition, controlling for year fixed effects to account for citywide changes over time,
and borough fixed effects to reflect organizational and social structural commonalities.
Subsequent models use a similar form, with progressively more precinct controls. The
second model adds controls for precinct socioeconomic conditions using the percent of the
population that is foreign born, and a principal components factor to summarize the level
of socioeconomic disadvantage.12 The third model examines the extent to which marijuana
stops, and their geographic distribution, vary with precinct crime conditions. Specifically,
this model controls for violent crime complaints in the previous year,13 anticipating that
police resources might be allocated more heavily to high crime areas. The fourth model
also includes a control for past-year marijuana arrests to test whether marijuana enforce-
ment practices are stable over time.14 Finally, our fifth model adds a control for the total
number of stops recorded in the precinct in the year, to account for the fact that marijuana
stops are likely to be more prevalent in areas subject to more stops overall.
Following our models of marijuana stop prevalence, we again examine how stop and
frisk activity fits into the NYPD’s broader strategy of marijuana enforcement. Levine and
Small (2008) posit that the majority of marijuana possession arrests begin as street stops,
and our descriptive analysis examines whether this is the case, and whether the race
disparities seen in arrests are mirrored in stop activity. We also define a measure of overall
11The 22nd Precinct (Central Park) is omitted from these models, as it has no relevant demographic or socioeco-
nomic data.
12Principal components factor analysis is commonly used to extract common thematic elements from several highly
correlated variables (see, e.g., Sampson & Raudenbush 1999). The socioeconomic disadvantage factor loads heavily
on precinct poverty levels, unemployment rate, and levels of physical disorder, as computed in Fagan et al. (2010).
13Crime complaints are measured by thousands, but substantive results are also robust to a control for logged crime
complaints. “Violent crime” complaints refer to homicide, rape, robbery, assault, arson, and kidnapping.
14Marijuana arrests are measured by thousands, but substantive results are also robust to a control for logged arrests.
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marijuana enforcement equal to the total of stops and arrests for marijuana,15 and replicate
the stop models to test whether overall enforcement patterns follow the same patterns as
marijuana stops. In this series, Models 1 through 3 examine levels of enforcement in each
precinct and year, and Models 4 and 5, by controlling for past-year arrests, examine changes
in enforcement patterns. Given that marijuana enforcement rose citywide from 2004–2008,
coefficients in these models identify precincts in which enforcement increased more
rapidly.
The next series of models examines how marijuana enforcement fits into the overall
stop and frisk strategy, and the stated goals of Order Maintenance Policing. Although OMP
cited the broken windows theory that the enforcement of minor crime would reduce more
serious crime as well, SQF emphasized gun detection, and about one stop in five is based on
suspicion of weapons possession. We test the links between marijuana stops and arrests and
each of these goals by building on our marijuana enforcement models, beginning with an
additional control for past-year disorder complaints.16 To the extent that marijuana stop
activity ties into a broader policy of order maintenance, we anticipate that measures of prior
disorder would significantly predict precinct stop levels. Next, we add an additional control
for weapons focus, or the percent of stops in each precinct and year on suspicion of
weapons possession. The extent to which marijuana stops are concentrated in precincts that
prioritize weapons possession may raise concerns that marijuana enforcement is used as a
pretext for a street stop in what is a de facto search for weapons.
3. Legality Analysis
We next we analyze the legality of marijuana stops, and their compliance with the Terry
standard of “reasonable suspicion.” The check-off recording system on the UF-250 is
grounded in case law, though it also gives officers an option to select two types of “other”
factors or circumstances that motivated the stop. This check-off method can generate more
than 300 unique combinations of the constitutionalizing stop factors or justifications alone.
When the additional circumstances options are considered, more than 9,000 unique combi-
nations of stop factors and additional circumstances are available, plus more combinations
when officers include “other” as a justification.17 For the 2.2 million stops, no single
combination appears in more than 15 percent of stops, making a complete analysis of all
factors listed nearly impossible.
To identify a set of cohesive and interpretable legal dimensions that reflect recurring
patterns among the 9,000 combinations of stop factors and additional circumstances, we
performed a principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation to extract the sets
of individual factors that best capture the distinct and recurring legal narratives that officers
15Marijuana arrests recorded in the street stop database are subtracted from this total to avoid double counting.
16Disorder complaints include those for: offenses against public order and sensibility (comprises 99 percent of
disorder complaints), alcoholic beverage control law, disorderly conduct, disruption of a religious service, fortune
telling, gambling, loitering, loitering for drug purposes, loitering for deviate sex, and loitering for gambling.
17Narrative or text explanations of the meaning of “other” were extremely rare.
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use to justify their stops. The principal components analysis yields a score that reflects the
weight of each individual item. We apply those weights to each record to compute a score
for each of the dimensions based on the combination of stop factors and additional
circumstances that are checked off for that record. We then aggregate these legality scores
for each precinct and year. These legality scores then are entered as predictors in the
models predicting marijuana enforcement patterns.18
We use two different metrics to assess the extent to which these factors indicate
reasonable suspicion. First, we assess the extent to which including them in models esti-
mating enforcement patterns improves our model fit.19 A consistent narrative of suspicion
for marijuana possession would suggest that the documented justifications would explain a
nontrivial proportion of the variation in enforcement patterns. On the other hand, arbi-
trary stop behaviors, or randomness in how stop justifications are invoked, would do little
to improve model fit. Next, we examine whether any of the separate legality dimensions are
statistically significant predictors of enforcement patterns. For example, we examine
whether a legality dimension that includes behaviors indicative of “casing” a location for a
crime is a significant predictor of enforcement patterns. We anticipate, for example, that
marijuana enforcement would be more prevalent in precincts where drug suspicion justifies
a greater portion of stop patterns.
4. Stop Efficiency and Public Safety
Finally, we examine the public safety payoffs associated with street-level marijuana enforce-
ment, particularly the extent to which marijuana stops are associated with the success of
OMP objectives. In particular, the objectives of SQF center on crime detection and weapons
seizures. Whatever the economic or social costs associated with marijuana stop tactics, to the
extent that marijuana stops are linked to weapons detection (measured both by the rate at
which weapons stops lead to arrests, and the rate that stops lead to weapons seizures), this
relationship might reflect a positive spillover, and a public safety benefit, of marijuana
policing. However, the converse would indicate a public safety tradeoff or compromise: if
marijuana stops are negatively associated with weapons seizures or overall arrests, then the
search for marijuana offenders comes at the cost of public safety.
IV. Results
A. Data Description
1. Average Precinct Characteristics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 375 precinct-year observations in our analysis,
and underscores the diversity of New York City, in terms of not only race and socioeconomic
18Because the use of principal components analysis for binary variables has raised some reliability concerns, we also
estimate models using several of the key binary variables themselves. Substantive results are similar.
19Model fit is measured using the marginal R 2 measure described in Ballinger (2004).
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conditions, but crime and policing conditions as well. For example, while NYPD officers
make an average of 137 stops per year on suspicion of marijuana possession in each
precinct, there are some precincts where no marijuana possession stops are made in a given
year, and others in which more than 1,000 such stops are made. Similar patterns are seen
in stop activity more broadly: the highest-stop precinct-year had more than 70 times as many
street stops made as in the lowest-stop observation.
Table 1 also suggests that while New York City is quite diverse, the city’s police
precincts are extremely segregated. On average, police precincts are 30 percent white and
26 percent black; however, there are precincts where virtually no whites live, and precincts
where virtually no blacks live, and precincts where more than 80 percent of residents are a
single race. Similar patterns emerge for Hispanics and for several aspects of socioeconomic
disadvantage, as well as violent crime levels.
2. Marijuana, Order Maintenance Policing, and Race-Ethnic Disparities
Both SQF activity and marijuana possession arrests have been touted as part of the NYPD’s
OMP strategy. However, we find that street stops for marijuana and marijuana possession
arrests are largely separate phenomena. Figure 2 shows that many of the precincts highest
in marijuana arrests record the fewest stops on suspicion of marijuana possession. It is
possible that differences between observed stop and arrest patterns are, at least in part, an
artifact of reporting practices. Under De Bour, for example, the “reasonable suspicion”
required for a street stop may be met and superseded by “probable cause” if marijuana is
found, which would permit escalation by Level IV under De Bour (i.e., resulting in a
“probable-cause” arrest). Although the NYPD Patrol Guide requires that street stops be
documented using UF-250 forms regardless of whether an arrest results, officers may
Table 1: Precinct-Level Enforcement, Demographic, Socioeconomic, and Crime
Characteristics (N = 375 Precinct-Year Observations)
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Marijuana possession stops 137.2 163.9 0 1,303
Marijuana possession arrests 419.9 445.9 7 2,472
Total marijuana enforcement 524.9 512.8 10 2,787
Total street stops 5,920.8 4,544.1 442 31,242
% Non-Hispanic white 30% 0.25 <1% 84%
% Non-Hispanic black 26% 0.26 <1% 89%
% Hispanic 30% 0.21 5% 79%
% Non-Hispanic other 14% 0.12 2% 70%
% Poverty 20% 0.11 5% 45%
% Unemployed 10% 0.05 3% 23%
Physical disorder (factor score) 0.06 1.66 -2.16 5.10
Violent crime (complaints) 651.0 333.1 66 1,937
Note: 22nd Precinct (Central Park) is excluded from calculations.
Sources: Street stop and crime complaints: NYPD, 2004–2008; Arrests: NY State DCJS, 2004–2008; Demographic and
employment data: ESRI, 2006; Poverty data: American Community Survey, 2005–2007; Physical disorder, NYCHVS,
2005.
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substitute arrest documentation when stops lead to arrest in place of the stop documenta-
tion. As a result, some of the arrest-producing stops are censored from the UF-250 database.
The New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board (2002) and the U.S. Commission on
Human Rights (2000) have both established that underfiling of UF-250 forms has histori-
cally been a problem. The inconsistency of stop documentation underscores the impor-
tance of examining race disparities in the totality of marijuana enforcement based not
simply on documented stop totals or arrest totals, but considering a combination of the two.
Nonetheless, whether examining arrests or street stops, the majority of marijuana
possession stops take place disproportionately in neighborhoods housing the city’s minority
population, both compared to their representation in the city’s population, and their
representation among marijuana arrestees. Accordingly, Table 2 shows that blacks are
overrepresented in the NYPD’s marijuana stop activity compared to their representation in
the general population. For example, officers stop blacks on suspicion of marijuana pos-
session at a rate of 14.83 per 1,000 population, while Hispanics are only stopped 5.41 times
per 1,000 population, and whites are stopped only 1.96 times per 1,000 population. This
pattern also holds for stop activity more broadly, with blacks stopped at a rate of 564 per
1,000 in the population and Hispanics stopped 269 times per 1,000, while whites are only
stopped 93 times per 1,000.
Similar disparities exist for marijuana arrests, with 48 blacks arrested for marijuana
possession for every 1,000 in the population, 24 Hispanics arrested per 1,000 population,
and 6 whites arrested per 1,000 population. The targeting of enforcement efforts toward
blacks and Hispanics is dramatically out of proportion to national statistics that suggest
comparable usage rates across racial groups (SAMHSA 2007) or higher rates of marijuana
use among whites (Saxe et al. 2001; Johnston et al. 2005).
Figure 2: Marijuana arrests and documented marijuana stop activity.
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Disparities in marijuana enforcement can also be seen geographically. Figure 3
details the geocoded locations of marijuana stops made between 2004 and 2008, and shows
substantial clustering in areas like the 73rd, 75th, and 79th Precincts. Figure 4 arrays these
precincts by race. The places with the highest concentration of marijuana stops are pre-
dominantly black neighborhoods.
B. Modeling Results
1. Marijuana Stop Levels
Table 3 presents the estimates from negative binomial GEE models predicting marijuana
stop levels by precinct and year. These models further quantify the disparities suggested in
Figures 3 and 4: marijuana stop activity is significantly higher in neighborhoods with a
greater concentration of black residents, and this relationship is not explained by differ-
ences in local socioeconomic conditions, or by historic crime levels, or by general enforce-
ment patterns (past-year marijuana arrests, or current year stop totals). For Hispanics, the
stop rates also are higher with higher population concentrations, but these effects are not
significant once controls for neighborhood social and crime conditions are included. In
Model 5, marijuana stops are negatively correlated with prior-year precinct crime rates and
enforcement activity: there are fewer marijuana stops in precincts in which violent crime
rates are higher, and where marijuana arrests in the past year were higher. Marijuana stops
are predicted by the total number of stops concurrently in the precinct. In other words,
there are fewer marijuana stops in places where marijuana arrests are greater, and more
stops where violent crime is lower, and where the total number of stops is higher. Marijuana
stops, in these places, seem to be a marginal enforcement activity—in effect, a luxury—that
is pursued in predominantly black neighborhoods beyond other enforcement efforts.
The negative relationship between past-year marijuana arrests and current-year mari-
juana stops can be interpreted in two ways. One interpretation is that this is a reporting
Table 2: Population and NYPD Enforcement Activity by Race/Ethnicity (Rate per 1,000
Population in Parentheses)
Race/Ethnicity Marijuana Stops All Street Stops Marijuana Arrests Total Arrests
Estimated 2006
Population
Black 29,854 1,134,539 97,069 748,029 2,012,646
(14.83) (563.71) (48.23) (371.66)
Hispanic 13,315 661,546 58,298 521,386 2,463,016
(5.41) (268.59) (23.67) (211.69)
White 4,931 233,179 15,168 181,545 2,512,415
(1.96) (92.81) (6.04) (72.26)
Other 3,604 191,025 2,886 56,487 1,282,782
(2,80) (148.91) (2.25) (44.03)
Race unknown 57 3,859 1,536 15,834 N/A
Total N 51,761 2,224,148 174,957 1,523,281 8,270,859
Note: Totals may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.
Sources: Stop counts and percents extrapolated from 10 percent random sample of stops from UF-250 data. Arrest
totals based on DCJS counts, 2004–2008. Population distribution based on citywide ESRI projections.
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Figure 3: New York City map of marijuana possession stops.
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Figure 4: New York City map, shading by tract percent black, overlaid with police precinct
boundaries.
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anomaly and artifact: officers making marijuana stops that produce arrests are bypassing the
stop documentation in favor of arrest documentation. Since marijuana arrest rates in these
places are higher, there may be unrecorded stops that in fact are producing arrests. Or, it
could be that marijuana arrests are produced by a different process than the process that
produces stops. In New York’s marijuana statutes, “plain-view” possession, such as smelling
smoke or observing marijuana, is itself probable cause for an arrest, and detection of
marijuana under those circumstances obviates the predicate or antecedent of the stop.
Levine and Small (2008) question the legality of those stops, citing a long tradition of
“dropsy” arrests that essentially entrap persons who are stopped into revealing that they
possess marijuana by making them empty their pockets.
2. Totality of Enforcement
If marijuana stops and arrests are conjoined in a complex enforcement process that
produces marijuana arrests but suppresses indicia of stops, then explaining the totality of
marijuana enforcement requires that we view stops and arrests as two parts of an integrated
tactic. Accordingly, we estimated models for the totality of marijuana enforcement: that is,
the sum of marijuana stops and arrests within a precinct.20 Table 4 shows that, as with total
marijuana stops, total enforcement levels are significantly higher in precincts with large
black populations, and this disparity is robust to controls for socioeconomic conditions,
past-year crime complaints, and prior enforcement patterns. Examining total marijuana
enforcement, the disparity for Hispanics also remains significant when other precinct
characteristics are controlled. The totality of marijuana enforcement is concentrated in the
city’s minority communities.
Here, there are interesting and important differences compared to the results in
Table 3 on stops alone. First, with due regard for the limitations of comparing R 2s across
models, model fits are much improved: the pseudo-R 2 in Model 5 in Table 4 is nearly 50
percent greater than in the comparable model in Table 3. Next, unlike models predicting
stop activity alone, total marijuana enforcement is significantly and positively predicted by
marijuana arrests in the previous year, further underscoring the importance of considering
stop and arrest activity combined. Further, unlike stop activity alone, total marijuana
enforcement is significantly predicted by violent crime in Models 3 and 4, though this
relationship is diminished and statistically insignificant in Model 5 once total stop activity
is controlled for. The insignificance of violent crime complaints in the face of overall stop
activity suggests that marijuana stop and arrest activity may be a consequence of the
broader stop and frisk targeted at high crime precincts. Moreover, the persistently higher
enforcement levels in black and Hispanic neighborhoods suggest that the tactics used in
these precincts are a disproportionate response to local crime conditions. As Fagan and
Davies (2000) and Fagan et al. (2010) showed with stop activity more generally, marijuana
enforcement seems to be focused not on violent crime, but on predominantly minority
neighborhoods.
20To avoid double counting stops that lead to an arrest and are documented in the UF-250 forms, we subtract the
number of marijuana arrests documented in the UF-250 forms from the “stop plus arrest” totals.
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3. Marijuana Enforcement and OMP
Table 5 examines the links between total marijuana enforcement and the two documented
objectives of order maintenance: reduction of disorder and the search for weapons.
Through programs such as Operation Condor,21 marijuana enforcement was an application
of broken windows theory, where policing of minor crimes was instrumental in reducing
rates of violent crime by reducing disorder. Weapons were a part of this focus. We estimate
a series of models that include crime complaints for several disorder crimes, such as public
drunkenness, loitering, and other offenses against public order, and the concentration of
street stops for weapons.
21Supra note 3.
Table 5: Negative Binomial Regressions Predicting Total Marijuana Enforcement by
Demographics, Crime, Other Enforcement, and OMP Objectives
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
“Full Model” from
Table 4, Model 5
Including Disorder
Complaints
Including
Weapons
Including Disorder
and Weapons
% Non-Hispanic black 1.688** 1.669** 1.59** 1.573**
[0.466] [0.457] [0.464] [0.455]
% Hispanic 1.58* 1.491* 1.507* 1.421*
[0.677] [0.670] [0.672] [0.665]
% Other race -0.624 -0.638 -0.562 -0.574
[0.814] [0.803] [0.803] [0.794]
SES disadvantage -0.0458 -0.0738 -0.0676 -0.0962
[0.110] [0.107] [0.106] [0.103]
% Foreign born -0.143 0.0446 -0.107 0.0782
[0.745] [0.788] [0.726] [0.769]
Lag violent crime 0.131 0.344 0.1 0.316
[0.221] [0.246] [0.221] [0.246]
Lag marijuana arrests 0.241** 0.243** 0.244** 0.246**
[0.0665] [0.0654] [0.0670] [0.0650]
Total stops (log) 0.454** 0.467** 0.473** 0.485**
[0.0878] [0.0881] [0.0892] [0.0898]
Lag disorder complaints -0.479 -0.479
[0.349] [0.349]
% Weapons stops 0.598* 0.588*
[0.241] [0.245]
Constant -9.97** -10.03** -10.19** -10.24**
[0.794] [0.777] [0.798] [0.784]
Observations 300 300 300 300
Number of precincts 75 75 75 75
Marginal R 2 0.76 0.78 0.76 0.78
Note: Models estimated as GEEs with AR(1) covariance within precincts. All models include fixed effects for
borough and year. Standard errors in brackets. Significance: **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
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Model 1 in Table 5 reproduces Model 5 from Table 4, examining the demographic,
socioeconomic, violent crime, and general enforcement predictors of marijuana stop
activity. This sets out a baseline to examine the influence of disorder in Model 2 in
Table 5. Model 2 shows virtually no relationship between disorder complaints and
marijuana street stops. The model fit is only slightly changed, and the parameter estimate
for disorder is not significant. The racial disparity for the percent non-Hispanic
black population and the percent Hispanic also is unaffected with the inclusion of
disorder.
Model 3 of Table 5 tests the link between marijuana stop activity and the other
principal goal of OMP, the search for weapons. We again find a strong and significant
connection between marijuana enforcement and precinct stop activity (total stops), and
also find a significant relationship between marijuana enforcement and the share of stops
that are based on suspicion of weapons possession. Marijuana stops and arrests are more
prevalent not only in precincts where overall stop activity is greater, but in precincts where,
holding stop levels constant, a greater portion of stops are on suspicion of weapons
possession. As in Model 1, marijuana enforcement is not predicted by violent crime, though
prior-year marijuana arrests predict current-year activity, a sign of the stability of the pattern
and practice over time.
In Model 4 of Table 5, which includes both disorder complaints and weapons focus
as additional controls, the predictive power of weapons focus is virtually unchanged. Not
only is enforcement disconnected from local crime conditions once overall stop patterns
are controlled for, but it also is disconnected from the indicia of disorder that are central
to the logic of OMP.
Marijuana enforcement activity is most active in precincts where overall enforcement
is most focused on weapons detection, but with little connection to crime or disorder
conditions in those places. This pattern raises unsettling concerns that officers use mari-
juana enforcement as a pretext for searching for weapons. It seems that marijuana enforce-
ment is an adjunct to overall OMP enforcement, disconnected from local crime conditions
but closely tied to the search for weapons. Total OMP enforcement, including the search
for weapons, leads to more extensive marijuana enforcement, but the allocation logic is
more closely tied to the racial and ethnic composition of the area than to crime conditions
or social structure.
4. The Legality of Stops
The modifications of the UF-250 form following the Spitzer Report (1999) have enabled a
more structured identification of the legal circumstances justifying a street stop; however,
officers retain considerable flexibility in reporting stop circumstances. Table 6 presents
factor loadings from a principal components factor analysis of the stop-level data, identify-
ing consistencies in the cited stop rationales. Although these factors combine to explain
only half the total variation in stop justification, several consistencies emerge.
The first factor suggests that stops justified by a suspect description are frequently also
justified with a report by a victim, witness, or officer. This relationship is encouraging
because it indicates that the descriptions used to justify stops have been obtained from
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legally sufficient sources,22 rather than from a vague profile unconnected to the case. The
second factor identifies suspicion generated by the suspect changing direction at the sight
of the officer and offering evasive responses when questioned. The third factor identifies
suspicion generated by suspects in a “high crime area” at a time of day fitting the incidence
of a crime.
The fourth factor identifies suspects who appear to be casing a victim or a location,
or acting as a lookout in conjunction with a planned crime. The fifth factor identifies stops
justified for “other” reasons, either as a stop justification alone or in conjunction with
“other” as additional circumstances. The sixth factor identifies actions indicating a drug
transaction, and the seventh identifies stops based on an individual carrying a “suspicious
object.” Although these factors explain only half the variance in the justifications for stop
22People v. Benjamin (1980); People v. Schwing (2005).
Table 6: Factor Loadings from Principal Components Analysis of Case-Level Stop
Justifications (N = 2,224,148)
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7
Stop Rationales
Carrying suspicious object -0.041 -0.085 0.014 -0.054 -0.113 -0.015 0.783
Fits a relevant description 0.818 -0.079 -0.094 -0.035 -0.082 -0.059 -0.040
Casing a victim or location -0.142 0.015 0.152 0.723 -0.217 -0.244 -0.034
Acting as a lookout -0.058 0.087 0.187 0.607 -0.184 0.034 -0.070
Wearing clothes commonly used in
a crime
0.107 0.258 0.321 -0.112 0.015 -0.167 0.069
Actions indicative of a drug transaction -0.083 0.050 0.026 -0.059 -0.100 0.817 -0.028
Furtive movements -0.144 0.578 0.064 -0.162 -0.296 0.042 -0.090
Actions of engaging in a violent crime 0.116 0.482 0.102 0.115 0.135 -0.120 0.112
Suspicious bulge -0.161 0.042 0.136 -0.573 -0.330 -0.326 -0.081
Other -0.121 -0.158 0.037 -0.138 0.804 -0.046 -0.007
Additional Circumstances
Report by victim/witness/officer 0.722 -0.045 -0.147 -0.007 -0.026 0.036 0.040
Ongoing investigation 0.159 0.254 0.393 0.200 0.026 -0.207 0.068
Proximity to scene of offense 0.558 0.049 0.280 -0.091 0.001 -0.064 -0.055
Evasive response to questioning -0.040 0.692 -0.069 0.086 -0.025 0.069 0.018
Associating with known criminals 0.170 0.143 0.277 -0.011 0.104 0.433 0.021
Change direction at sight of officer -0.100 0.651 -0.055 0.028 -0.158 0.079 -0.043
Area has high crime incidence -0.204 -0.115 0.694 0.091 -0.030 0.113 0.002
Time of day fits crime incidence -0.048 0.015 0.718 0.102 -0.019 -0.002 -0.011
Sights or sounds of criminal activity 0.013 0.124 -0.022 0.050 0.155 -0.014 0.639
Other -0.005 0.051 -0.141 -0.022 0.569 -0.116 -0.091
Eigenvalue 2.170 1.701 1.533 1.225 1.174 1.123 1.047
Factor variance explained 0.1085 0.0851 0.0766 0.0613 0.0587 0.0561 0.0523
Cumulative variance explained 0.1085 0.1936 0.2702 0.3315 0.3902 0.4463 0.4986
Note: Factor loadings based on varimax rotation. “Thematic” stop justifications (with factor loading magnitudes
greater than 0.6) are highlighted in bold.
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activity, they form substantively meaningful narratives that may explain disparities in mari-
juana street stop practices.
Table 7 replicates the marijuana enforcement models from Table 4, including addi-
tional controls for the strongest individual items in each of the seven stop factors. We also
estimated these models using only marijuana street stops, since only a portion of marijuana
arrests result from undocumented marijuana stops. The results are the same for both sets
of models, suggesting that legal narratives fit comparably in explaining both stops and total
enforcement. For each model, we note changes in goodness of fit when the stop rationales
are included.
In each of the models, several of the stop factors computed in Table 5 are indeed
significant predictors of marijuana enforcement at the precinct level. In all models, mari-
juana stops are significantly more prevalent in precincts where stops are likely to be
justified by suspicion of a drug transaction, suggesting that police officers are particularly
sensitive to drug issues in these precincts. It is unlikely that the “drug transaction” factor
simply reflects high levels of marijuana stops, since documented marijuana stops comprise
fewer than 3 percent of the stops recorded in the city from 2004–2008. Instead, the factors
are likely to reflect police enforcement priorities and narratives of suspicion in each
precinct.
Marijuana stops are also more prevalent in precincts where large portions of street
stops are justified by “other” rationales, and in some models, when stops take place in
what officers deem a “high crime area” (which is correlated with “time of day”). These
stop rationales are cause for concern, as neither of these factors, on its face, is constitu-
tionally sufficient to justify a street stop, and is opaque with respect to the specific con-
ditions that motivated the stop. While “high crime area” may justify a stop in conjunction
with other factors, it is not legally sufficient in conjunction with “time of day.” Finally,
marijuana stops are less prevalent in precincts justifying a large portion of stops with
suspect descriptions, or the suspicion of casing. Table 4 suggested that when considered
in the context of overall stop patterns, marijuana enforcement was disconnected from
crime conditions, and the negative influence of these crime-specific stop rationales seems
to confirm that disconnect.
The bottom rows of Table 7 examine the goodness of fit of stop models, both with
and without controls for precinct-level stop rationales. While Model 1 suggests that stop
rationales explain more of the variation in stop patterns than does racial composition itself,
these factors explain less than 5 percent more of the variance in enforcement activity.
Moreover, as more controls are added for precinct socioeconomic conditions, crime levels,
and more general enforcement patterns, models including stop justifications actually
explain a smaller portion of total variance in enforcement. More detailed models with
progressively more controls indicate that the stop rationales explain less and less of the
variation in marijuana stop levels. These models suggest few systematic links between the
rationales for street stop activity and the levels of marijuana enforcement realized. Instead,
even with a full set of legal justifications, marijuana enforcement seems to be explained by
the racial composition of the area and previous enforcement levels, rather than by crime
conditions or social structure. Despite the inclusion of legal justifications and rationales for
stops, marijuana enforcement is significantly higher in precincts with large black and
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Table 7: Negative Binomial Regression of Total Marijuana Enforcement by Precinct
Demography, Socioeconomic Conditions, Crime, Enforcement, and Stop Justifications,
2004–2008
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Racial
Composition
Only
Including
SES and
Foreign Born
Including
Past-Year
Violent Crime
Including
Past-Year
Marijuana Arrests
Including
Total Stops
% Non-Hispanic black 2.025** 1.832** 1.615** 1.512** 1.442**
[0.371] [0.427] [0.455] [0.451] [0.426]
% Hispanic 1.94** 1.577** 1.81** 1.749** 1.635**
[0.389] [0.575] [0.589] [0.575] [0.547]
% Other race -0.371 -0.672 -0.177 0.0085 -0.151
[0.672] [0.847] [0.747] [0.726] [0.687]
SES disadvantage 0.074 -0.0532 -0.0481 -0.0652
[0.101] [0.0981] [0.0956] [0.0966]
% Foreign born 0.307 0.0537 -0.247 -0.147
[0.520] [0.574] [0.603] [0.595]
Lag violent crime 0.686** 0.567* 0.234
[0.238] [0.221] [0.204]
Lag marijuana arrests 0.265** 0.292**
[0.0825] [0.0821]
Total stops (logged) 0.400**
[0.101]
Legal Justifications
Fits relevant description -0.973** -0.988** -0.968** -0.994** -0.469
[0.202] [0.205] [0.274] [0.271] [0.290]
Evasive response 0.411 0.417 0.399 0.379 0.428
[0.238] [0.241] [0.284] [0.276] [0.258]
High crime area 0.274 0.271 0.527* 0.528* 0.391
[0.161] [0.162] [0.209] [0.209] [0.205]
Casing victim or location -0.0944 -0.0894 -0.165 -0.124 -0.148
[0.195] [0.196] [0.199] [0.199] [0.193]
Other stop justification 0.406* 0.424* 0.731** 0.757** 0.83**
[0.177] [0.178] [0.247] [0.237] [0.238]
Drug transaction 0.790** 0.786** 0.732** 0.782** 0.868**
[0.175] [0.179] [0.204] [0.205] [0.208]
Carrying suspicious object 0.282 0.287 0.326 0.357 0.372
[0.306] [0.313] [0.395] [0.394] [0.397]
Constant -6.298** -6.201** -6.549** -6.476** -9.669**
[0.392] [0.435] [0.445] [0.443] [0.809]
Observations 375 375 300 300 300
Number of precincts 75 75 75 75 75
Marginal R 2 (no justifications) 0.61 0.61 0.73 0.76 0.76
Marginal R 2 (with justifications) 0.64 0.64 0.69 0.69 0.65
Note: Total marijuana enforcement computed as: marijuana stops + marijuana arrests — marijuana arrests in stop
documentation. Models structured as GEEs with AR(1) covariance within precincts. All models contain fixed effects
for borough and year. Standard errors in brackets. Significance: **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
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Hispanic populations. The persistent race disparities in marijuana enforcement activity
suggest legality may simply be a cosmetic or post-hoc justification for overall marijuana
enforcement.
5. Stop Efficacy and Public Safety
Given the emphasis of OMP on weapons detection and seizure, and the links between
marijuana and weapons policing demonstrated in Table 5, we evaluate the public safety
implications of marijuana enforcement based primarily on its role in weapons detection.
Table 8 classifies the 2.2 million stops between 2004 and 2008 into four categories, based on
the crimes suspected that are recorded for each stop: marijuana possession stops, weapons
possession stops, violent crime stops, and “other” stops, encompassing property crimes,
minor crimes such as trespass and quality of life offenses, other offenses, and stops with no
suspected crime interpretable. The table suggests that street stops are highly unlikely to
lead directly to weapon seizures—weapons are seized in fewer than 1 percent of stops. Even
among stops driven by suspicion of weapons possession, seizure rates are less than 3
percent. Marijuana stops, despite a prevalence that covaries with weapons stops at the
precinct level, lead to weapon seizures in only approximately one-half of 1 percent of stops.
If marijuana enforcement is designed to stop more serious crime by catching criminals “on
their day off” (Maple & Mitchell 1999), it is quite inefficient.
At the precinct level, the link between the tactic of marijuana street stops and success
in the search for weapons is equally tenuous. Figure 5 shows that the average annual count
of weapons seizures is indeed higher in precincts where police make more marijuana
stops.23 However, this relationship is likely spurious to other policing factors: weapons
seizures are more often produced by stops unrelated to marijuana. Moreover, Figure 6
suggests that at high levels of marijuana stops within a precinct, the likelihood that any type
of stop yields a weapon seizure declines. In other words, these additional marijuana stops
have diminishing marginal returns in the search for weapons.
23This relationship is sensitive to measurement choice. Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate the relationship between
enforcement and public safety using logarithmic transformation of both stops and seizures. When using raw counts
of stops and seizures, the positive relationship between stops and seizures appears to be driven by a single high-stop
observation (103rd Precinct, 2004), and the relationship between stops and seizure rates declines more rapidly.
Table 8: Weapons Seizure Rates Associated with Four
Categories of Street Stops, 2004–2008
Crime Suspected Number of Stops Made Weapons Seizure Rate
Marijuana possession 52,018 0.49%
Weapons possession 442,552 2.37%
Violent crime 340,792 0.71%
Other offenses 1,388,786 0.43%
Total 2,224,148 0.86%
Note: Weapons seizure rates based on seizures documented in UF-250
database, resulting from each type of stop.
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The negative relationship between marijuana stops and weapon seizures may, alter-
natively, reflect a deterrent effect in which citizens refrain from carrying weapons in
anticipation of being stopped by the police. However, per-capita homicide rates declined by
2.7 percent across the country between 2004 and 2008, suggesting a nationwide decrease in
the prevalence and use of firearms. The reduced prevalence of weapon possession in New
York City is likely to reflect this secular trend, rather than a causal effect of local policing
practices, and high levels of street stops are likely to be limited in their productivity.
Figure 5: Precinct-level weapon seizures and marijuana stop volume.
Figure 6: Precinct-level weapon seizure rate and marijuana stop volume, 2004–2008.
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We test this notion further in a series of models that examine the public safety
benefits associated with marijuana stop activity. Table 9 presents the regression coefficients
from four models, each with a negative binomial functional form predicting the number of
weapons seizures made from street stops in a given precinct and year. The first two models
in this table, like the stop and enforcement models in Tables 2–4 and 6, use a population
exposure. The third and fourth models use precinct stop totals as an exposure for seizures,
thereby approximating a model of the precinct seizure rate.24
Models 1 and 2 of Table 9 suggest that weapon seizures are indeed higher in pre-
cincts and years with higher overall stop volumes; however, they suggest no significant
relationship between marijuana enforcement and weapons detection above and beyond
that associated with total stop volume. In other words, marijuana enforcement adds no
public safety benefit to overall OMP efforts. Moreover, when considering the likelihood of
each individual street stop to lead to a weapon seizure in Models 3 and 4, marijuana
enforcement is not only unrelated to weapon seizures, the relationship between total stops
and seizures per stop is significant and negative, suggesting that stop-and-frisk patterns may
have diminishing returns in the search for weapons when conducted in conjunction with
marijuana enforcement.
V. Discussion
A. Epidemiology of Marijuana Enforcement
Since the mid-1990s, OMP strategies have leveraged the enforcement of social and physical
disorder in attempts to identify more serious offenders, uncover weapons, and reduce
crime opportunities. The result was the aggressive interdiction, temporary detention, and
questioning of New Yorkers, an average of more than half a million times each year
beginning in 2004, with about nine in ten resulting in no finding of wrongdoing (Fagan
et al. 2010). The manifestation of disorder that attracted the most intensive police atten-
tion was the plain-view possession of marijuana (Levine & Small 2008; Golub et al. 2007;
Harcourt & Ludwig 2007). Over the decade beginning in 1998, NYPD officers made more
than 35,000 misdemeanor marijuana arrests per year (Levine & Small 2008), an effort that
required a massive mobilization of police resources, and a substantial outlay of public
dollars.
The NYPD’s focus on low-level disorder, and on marijuana in particular, has raised
recurring concerns related both to the racial distribution of enforcement patterns and to
the disconnect with the crime control interests of criminal justice policy. We find that these
concerns remain salient, and are well-grounded empirically. We show significant racial
disparities in the implementation of marijuana enforcement activity; street stops for
24We estimated the risk of Type II error in identifying the effects of marijuana stops (or overall enforcement) on
weapons seizures by conducting a power analysis. We use G*Power 3 (Faul et al. 2007) to estimate power for varying
effect sizes, using the Cohen (1988) convention of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 for small, medium, and large effect sizes. We
find over 90 percent power to detect even small effects using two-tailed t tests at a = 0.05 with 300 precinct-year
observations.
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marijuana are more prevalent in precincts with large black populations, as are combined
marijuana stop and arrest totals. This disparity holds up across neighborhoods after con-
trolling for local crime and socioeconomic conditions. Moreover, stop patterns are discon-
nected from patterns of the social disorder complaints that are a central feature of Order
Maintenance Policing. Instead, marijuana stops are higher in precincts with a greater focus
on weapons enforcement.
1. The Reengineering of Broken Windows Theory
The disconnect between marijuana enforcement patterns and precinct disorder conditions
underscores the divergence of OMP tactics from their underpinnings in the broken
windows theory. In its pristine form, “broken windows” presented disorder as a signal that
local guardianship was weak and that crime would be tolerated, inviting a criminal invasion
(Wilson & Kelling 1982; Skogan 1990). In the development of OMP, Jack Maple saw this
link as mystical, and dismissed the idea that murderers and other serious offenders would
be affected by neighborhood conditions such as graffiti, abandoned cars, or trash-strewn
vacant lots (Maple & Mitchell 1999). He was therefore far less concerned with the much-
publicized “squeegee men” who harassed motorists at the entrances to bridges and tunnels
entering Manhattan, and more concerned with the idea that serious offenders, when not
actively involved in violent crimes, were likely to be engaged in disorderly behavior such as
public drinking or smoking marijuana. This meant that the disorderly were likely to be
carrying weapons or other contraband, or to be on their way to or from robberies or other
violent crimes. To stop them, police had to preemptively and aggressively engage them,
question them, and, if necessary, frisk and search them for weapons or contraband.
The disconnect between marijuana enforcement and disorder complaints, and its
close ties to weapons enforcement and precinct racial composition, suggests that street
stops for marijuana possession may serve as a pretext for higher rates of citizen interdictions
in pursuit of weapons in minority neighborhoods, rather than the regulation of low-level
offenses or even enforcement of marijuana laws. In other words, police in New York are
doubling down on weapons enforcement by also searching for marijuana.
2. Pot as Pretext
The legal rationales for marijuana enforcement also suggest both a racial skew and a
pretextual nature of citizen stops and marijuana arrests. Despite recent litigation requiring
police officers to specify the reasons for each stop, we find recurring patterns of stops that
lack legal justification under both federal and New York law. The documented justifications
for street stops suggest that marijuana stops are most prevalent not only where officers place
a high priority on drug transactions, but also where stops are justified based on suspects’
presence in a “high crime area” and “other” nonspecific circumstances, justifications that,
on their face, are constitutionally insufficient to justify a street stop. Moreover, the legal
narratives of suspicion provided for stop activity do little to explain the precinct-level
variation in stop activity. Black and Hispanic precincts seem to be targeted for marijuana
enforcement at levels above what legal justifications and other precinct characteristics
would suggest are appropriate.
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B. Public Safety Implications
Marijuana enforcement is inefficient to a point where it may distract from other strategies
to produce security. While weapons seizures are indeed more prevalent in areas with
higher stop levels, each street stop made is associated with a lower probability of weapon
seizures, suggesting diminishing returns to SQF activity. Although the detection of
weapons is one of the overarching goals of OMP, and marijuana enforcement is one of
the tactical engines of OMP, fewer than one half of 1 percent of marijuana stops lead to
the seizure of a weapon, and marijuana enforcement is not significantly correlated with
the detection of weapons.
The public safety rationale for marijuana enforcement is not well-grounded in crimi-
nological theory. Beyond the relative futility of marijuana stops, and street stops more
generally, in the detection of firearms, the links between marijuana and more serious crime
are tenuous. Given the doubts cast on the causal relationship between physical and social
disorder and more serious crime (Sampson & Raudenbush 1999; Harcourt 1998, 2001;
Taylor 2001), there is little reason to expect that the disruption of marijuana possession and
use will reduce violent crime or any other crime.
Marijuana itself is also largely disconnected from dangerous behavior, particularly
violent crime. As early as the 1930s, while lurid headlines across the country proclaimed
that marijuana was a dangerous drug that caused crime, these claims were dismissed in a
six-year scientific study at the New York Academy of Medicine (Mayor’s Committee on
Marihuana 1944). The NYAM scientists found that marijuana is neither addictive, nor a
“determinating factor” in major crimes. Research beginning in the 1970s concluded much
the same. The linkage of marijuana to crime is both contingent on contextual factors, and
spurious to underlying personal characteristics (for reviews, see Watters et al. 1985; Fagan
1990, 1993; MacCoun et al. 2003).
In addition, contrary to “gateway” hypotheses, few users of marijuana progress to
using harder drugs, and the causal paths are complex and mediated by both observed
and unobserved personal characteristics. For example, Golub and Johnson (2001) dismiss
dire predictions of future hard-drug abuse by youths who came of age in the 1990s. They
examined several waves of the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse from 1979–
1997, and concluded that any increase in youthful marijuana use in the 1990s has been
offset by lower rates of progression to hard-drug use among youths born in the 1970s.
Connections between marijuana use and progression to other drugs is more likely to be
produced through a correlation with (unobserved) personal characteristics rather than a
causal path (van Ours 2003). Nor is there a connection through marijuana markets:
several studies show that marijuana markets are segmented from cocaine and heroin
markets, reducing the likelihood that disrupting marijuana buys will have any effects on
the more violence-prone heroin and cocaine markets (for a review, see Caulkins &
Reuter 1998).
In light of the empirical evidence documenting marijuana’s equivocal relationship to
both more serious forms of drug use and to other crimes, the city’s dogged pursuit of
marijuana use begs explanation. For a short time after the war on marijuana began in New
York, the discourse on the escalation of marijuana enforcement focused on how marijuana
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markets had replaced the waning street markets in cocaine and crack, how marijuana had
become more potent and its users more behaviorally unpredictable, and that the violence
of those markets had migrated to marijuana markets (Flynn 2001). However, the prediction
of marijuana-fueled violence seems to have been a false alarm. Homicides reached a 45-year
low of 466 in 2009, and overall crime is down by 35 percent since that discourse on
marijuana was first advanced nearly a decade ago. Marijuana use rates among high school
and college students across the nation have been relatively flat since 1999 (Johnston et al.
2005), yet the insistence on marijuana’s dangers still translates into widespread and racially
imbalanced misdemeanor marijuana arrests. Nor are the arrests brief and nonintrusive
encounters: persons arrested on misdemeanor marijuana charges are routinely booked,
strip searched, and detained for as long as 48 hours until they are arraigned on charges that
are almost always dismissed (Golway 2000). Observing a sweep of six marijuana arrests at the
outset of the current war on marijuana a decade ago, one detective lamented that rather
than lowering crime, “[w]e’re just ruining people’s lives now” (Sargent 2001).
VI. Conclusion
The striking feature of the war on marijuana in New York City is not simply the racial
imbalance in enforcement compared to the racial distribution of marijuana use (cf. Saxe
et al. 2001; Johnston et al. 2005), nor its disconnect from crime conditions or the legality of
marijuana stops, nor its diminishing returns in the chase for weapons; rather, the broad
reach of marijuana enforcement, and of OMP more generally, deserves the greatest atten-
tion. In 2006, the NYPD made more than 32,000 arrests for marijuana possession, and over
506,000 stops, including 64,166 stops of black males between the ages of 15 and 19, or an
average rate of 77 stops for every 100 such persons.25 Of these stops, fewer than 4 percent
resulted in an arrest, and fewer than one half of 1 percent revealed a weapon.26
OMP practices have persisted through sharp criticism (Spitzer 1999; Greene 1999;
Harcourt 2001; Levine & Small 2008) and civil rights litigation against the city. However,
the intractability of racial disparities in police practices in the face of prior judicial efforts
at constitutional oversight raise difficult questions about the prospects for either legal or
democratic regulation of policing. The deep reach of OMP into the city’s minority com-
munities has serious social costs, undermining perceived police legitimacy, and potentially
25ESRI projections suggest that approximately 6.6 million of the city’s 8.3 million residents in 2006 were over the age
of 15.
26Street stops are hardly neutral with respect to the person stopped and found to be innocent of any wrongdoing.
Stuntz (1998) notes four distinct harms that victims of unjustified and inaccurate stops might suffer. “The first is a
harm to the victim’s privacy—the injury suffered if some agent of the state rummages around in the victim’s briefcase,
or examines the contents of his jacket pockets. The second is . . . ‘targeting harm,’ the injury suffered by one who is
singled out by the police and publicly treated like a criminal suspect. Third is the injury that flows from discrimina-
tion, the harm a black suspect feels when he believes he is treated the way he is treated because he is black. Fourth
is the harm that flows from police violence, the physical injury and associated fear of physical injury that attends the
improper police use of force.”
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leading to civilian withdrawal from the co-production of public safety (Tyler & Fagan 2008).
The diminishing returns of street stops in the production of public safety suggests not only
that the practice has an unjustified and disparate impact on the city’s minority population,
but that the broader enforcement strategy is misguided in its approach to crime control.
Marijuana enforcement consumes a great deal of police resources, and for the past
decade has been a stable feature of the policing landscape in New York. The social and
political objectification of marijuana through this time gave police institutions the oppor-
tunity to transform marijuana enforcement to a use virtually unrelated to their central aim
of crime reduction. The purpose of the marijuana doctrine, instead, may be the expansion
of the panoptical or intelligence-generating dimension of police work, enhancing the
centrality of police organizations without the burden of distributional or efficiency con-
cerns. As practiced, the lack of police discretion in marijuana enforcement signals indif-
ference to those concerns, and threatens to instantiate among the policed a deeply rooted
culture of permanent challenge to police authority. Whether policing without legitimacy is
sustainable remains a worrisome question.
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Appendix A: New York State Penal Law
§ 221.05-221.30: Possession of Marihuana
§ 221.05 Unlawful possession of marihuana. A person is guilty of unlawful possession of
marihuana when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses marihuana. Unlawful possession of
marihuana is a violation punishable only by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars.
However, where the defendant has previously been convicted of an offense defined in this
article or article 220 of this chapter, committed within the three years immediately preced-
ing such violation, it shall be punishable (a) only by a fine of not more than two hundred
dollars, if the defendant was previously convicted of one such offense committed during
such period, and (b) by a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars or a term of
imprisonment not in excess of fifteen days or both, if the defendant was previously con-
victed of two such offenses committed during such period.
§ 221.10 Criminal possession of marihuana in the fifth degree. A person is guilty of criminal
possession of marihuana in the fifth degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses: 1.
marihuana in a public place, as defined in section 240.00 of this chapter, and such
marihuana is burning or open to public view; or 2. one or more preparations, compounds,
mixtures or substances containing marihuana and the preparations, compounds, mixtures
or substances are of an aggregate weight of more than twenty-five grams. Criminal posses-
sion of marihuana in the fifth degree is a class B misdemeanor.
§ 221.15 Criminal possession of marihuana in the fourth degree. A person is guilty of
criminal possession of marihuana in the fourth degree when he knowingly and unlawfully
possesses one or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances containing mari-
huana and the preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances are of an aggregate weight
of more than two ounces. Criminal possession of marihuana in the fourth degree is a class
A misdemeanor.
§ 221.20 Criminal possession of marihuana in the third degree. A person is guilty of criminal
possession of marihuana in the third degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses one
or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances containing marihuana and the
preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances are of an aggregate weight of more than
eight ounces. Criminal possession of marihuana in the third degree is a class E felony.
§ 221.25 Criminal possession of marihuana in the second degree. A person is guilty of
criminal possession of marihuana in the second degree when he knowingly and unlawfully
possesses one or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances containing mari-
huana and the preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances are of an aggregate weight
of more than sixteen ounces. Criminal possession of marihuana in the second degree is a
class D felony.
§ 221.30 Criminal possession of marihuana in the first degree. A person is guilty of crimi-
nal possession of marihuana in the first degree when he knowingly and unlawfully
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possesses one or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances containing mari-
huana and the preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances are of an aggregate
weight of more than ten pounds. Criminal possession of marihuana in the first degree is
a class C felony.
Appendix B: Specific Police Conduct Permitted Under
DE BOUR
1. What is a Stop?
Police stop and frisk procedures have been ruled constitutional under specific conditions
articulated in Terry v. Ohio (1968). Under Terry, Fourth Amendment restrictions on unrea-
sonable searches and seizures allow a police officer to stop a suspect on the street and
search him or her without probable cause to arrest if the police officer has a reasonable
suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. For
their own protection, police may perform a quick surface search of the person’s outer
clothing for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is armed.
This reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable facts” and not merely
upon an officer’s hunch.
2. Permissible Behaviors
New York law regulates police conduct more thoroughly than does Terry. New York
law articulates a four-step analysis articulated in People v. De Bour (1976) and People v.
Holmes (1996). Stops are governed by N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law Section 140.50(1)
(2007):
In addition to the authority provided by this article for making an arrest without a warrant, a
police officer may stop a person in a public place located within the geographical area of such
officer’s employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed
or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may
demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct.
“Stops” and “frisks” are considered separately under New York statutes. A police
officer may stop a suspect but not be permitted to frisk the suspect given the circum-
stances. Frisks and searches are governed by N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law Section
140.50(3), which requires a legitimate “stop” as a predicate to any frisk.27 In many cases,
27“When upon stopping a person under circumstances prescribed in subdivisions one and two a police officer or court
officer, as the case may be, reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury, he may search such person for
a deadly weapon or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing serious physical injury and of a sort
not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons. If he finds such a weapon or instrument, or any other
property possession of which he reasonably believes may constitute the commission of a crime, he may take it and
keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest
such person.” N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50(3).
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reasonable suspicion that a person is engaging in violent or dangerous crime (such as
murder, burglary, assault, etc.) will justify both a stop and a frisk. Table B1 shows the
circumstances that are necessary for a stop to escalate to a frisk and ultimately to an
arrest. Table B2 shows the specific police actions that are permitted at each level of a
Terry/De Bour stop in New York.
Table B1: De Bour’s Four Levels of Street Encountersa
Predicate Permissible Response
Level 1 Objective credible reason approach to request
information
Level 2 Founded suspicion—common-law right of inquiry
Level 3 Reasonable suspicion stop and (if fear of weapon) frisk
Level 4 Probable-cause arrest and full search incident
aPeople v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976).
Table B2: Permissible Actions by Police Officers During Stops
Predicate Permissible Response
Level 1 PO can ask nonthreatening questions regarding name, address, destination, and, if person
carrying something unusual, police officer can ask about that. Encounter should be brief
and nonthreatening. There should be an absence of harassment and intimidation.
PO can:
say “STOP” (if not “forceful”)
approach a stopped car
touch holster.
PO cannot:
request permission to search
cause people to reasonably believe they’re suspected of crime, no matter how calm and polite
the tone of the questions
Level 2 PO can ask pointed questions that would reasonably lead one to believe that he/she is
suspected of a crime. Questions can be more extended and accusatory. Focus on possible
criminality.
PO can:
request permission to search
PO cannot:
pursue
forcibly detain
Level 3 PO can:
forcibly detain
frisk for weapons if in fear
pull car out of traffic flow
order defendant to lie on the ground
handcuff (for good reason)
pursue
Level 4 PO can arrest and search suspect
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Appendix C: Replication of the NYPD’s UF-250 Form
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Appendix D: Stop Rationales and Additional
Circumstances Listed on UF-250
Stop Rationales Additional Circumstances
Carrying suspicious object Report by victim/witness/officer
Fits a relevant description Ongoing investigation
Casing a victim or location Proximity to scene of offense
Acting as a lookout Evasive response to questioning
Wearing clothes commonly used in a crime Associating with known criminals
Actions indicative of a drug transaction Change direction at sight of officer
Furtive movements Area has high crime incidence
Actions of engaging in a violent crime Time of day fits crime incident
Suspicious bulge Sights or sounds of criminal activity
Other Other
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